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Introduction
“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” This 
quote is attributed to Danish physicist and Nobel prize winner 
Niels Bohr, but the difficulty of making predictions does not 
stop us from making forecasts of economic, demographic, 
and other variables. Investors, businesses, policy makers and 
others use these forecasts to inform their decisions about 
investments and policy settings where understanding of the 
future trajectory and levels of costs and benefits are essential. 
One key example is forecasts of future population. The size 
and distribution (whether geographic, age, ethnic, or some 
other distribution) of the future population is a critical input 
into urban and other planning. Understanding the methods 
and limitations of forecasts is an important but often under-
appreciated task for planners and policymakers.
The relative  
(un)certainty  
of subnational  
population decline In this article, I draw on more than a decade of experience in developing 
population projections for local councils 
and others, as well as the latest in 
population projection methods, to 
provide an answer to the question: “Is 
population decline inevitable for New 
Zealand’s rural and peripheral areas?” A 
recent term, coined by economist 
Shamubeel Eaqub (2014), ‘zombie towns’, 
refers to population centres facing 
irreversible population decline. However, 
such a categorical statement (‘irreversible 
population decline’), does not reflect the 
uncertainty of population projections, or 
indeed the uncertainty of the future 
population distribution of New Zealand. 
Moreover, as I show in this article, it does 
not reflect the projected experience of the 
majority of territorial authorities (TAs) 
(or indeed, towns) in New Zealand, even 
many in rural or peripheral areas. While 
many areas are currently in decline, and 
these and others will decline in the future, 
such population decline is not certain 
except in a minority of cases that is large 
and growing.
In this article, I first outline some of 
the key points that decision-makers 
need to understand about population 
projections, focusing especially on the 
Dr Michael Cameron is Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Waikato, and 
Research Associate, National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis (NIDEA), University of 
Waikato (mcam@waikato.ac.nz).
Page 56 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017
role and sources of uncertainty. I then 
briefly outline a recently developed state-
of-the-art stochastic subnational pop-
ulation projection model (Cameron & 
Poot 2014a, 2016). Finally, I use the 
model to evaluate the probability of New 
Zealand’s TAs experiencing population 
decline over the periods 2013–2023, 
2033–2043 and 2053–2063. This exercise 
complements the analysis at the town 
level by Jackson and Brabyn (infra), and 
clearly charts the progression from 
subnational population growth to 
decline, particularly for rural and 
peripheral areas.
What everyone should know about 
population projections
The first thing that decision-makers 
should understand about population 
projections is the difference between a 
‘forecast’ and a ‘projection’. A population 
forecast is a ‘best’ estimate of the future 
population (and its distribution) at some 
future time. In contrast, a population 
projection is a measure of the future 
population that is based on a specific 
model with known and quantified 
assumptions that are incorporated into 
the model. A population projection is 
therefore not necessarily the same as a 
forecast, since alternative scenarios based 
on different sets of assumptions will 
naturally lead to different projections. A 
range of different sets of assumptions will 
lead to a range of different projections of 
the future population.
The second thing that decision-makers 
should understand is uncertainty. 
Population projections are uncertain. 
Uncertainty arises from several sources, 
including the correctness of the model 
(model uncertainty), the parameters or 
assumptions that drive the model 
(parameter uncertainty), and natural 
variation in the input variables for the 
model (parametric variability) (Kennedy 
& O’Hagan 2001).
Acknowledging that population 
projections are uncertain is challenging 
for decision-makers. It is attractive to 
believe, when looking at a single line on a 
graph tracking a given population 
projection or a single row of a table, that 
the numbers represent the ‘one true 
future’, because this makes decision-
making much simpler. Several times I 
have encountered decision-makers who, 
despite understanding that projections 
are uncertain, are more than willing to 
ignore that uncertainty for the simplicity 
of a single ‘magic number’ population 
projection.
The third thing that decision-makers 
should understand is that the degree of 
uncertainty in projections is not constant. 
It is greater the further into the future we 
project (for example, see Figure 1 below), 
as we can be more certain (or less 
uncertain) about the state of the world in 
the near future than we can about the far 
future. Uncertainty is also greater for 
smaller areas (for example, territorial 
authorities) than for larger areas (for 
example, regions) (Cameron & Poot 
2011).
Fortunately, methods are available 
that explicitly quantify the degree of 
uncertainty in population projections. A 
relatively crude way of quantifying 
uncertainty is to create a small number of 
different population projection scenarios 
(for example, high, medium, and low 
scenarios). Until relatively recently, this 
was the approach adopted by Statistics 
New Zealand at both the national and 
subnational levels. Several problems arise 
with this approach, not least of which is 
that it makes little use of the known 
distribution of each parameter (fertility, 
mortality, and migration). To improve on 
this, over the last two decades or more 
demographers have increasingly begun to 
use stochastic (or probabilistic) pop-
ulation projection models (Tuljapurkar 
1992; Bryant 2005; Bijak et al., 2015). 
These models draw repeatedly from the 
parameter distributions, creating 
hundreds or thousands of population 
projection scenarios. This allows a better 
understanding of the range of future 
population to be explicitly quantified. 
This approach was first piloted for New 
Zealand national projections by Wilson 
(2005) before being adopted by Statistics 
New Zealand (Dunstan 2011). At the 
subnational level, the method was first 
employed by Cameron & Poot (2010, 
2011), and has since been applied several 
times (Cameron et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 
2014).
A subnational stochastic population 
projection model
The workhorse of population projections 
methods is the cohort component model 
(CCM), which I employ at the TA-level 
(excluding the Chatham Islands). The 
CCM is simple, intuitive, and elegant. 
Population is assumed to change through 
only three components: (1) births; (2) 
deaths; and (3) migration. To project 
the population requires only projections 
of parameters for fertility (for example, 
age-specific fertility rates), mortality 
(for example, age-specific mortality or 
survivorship rates), and migration.
The model I employ is similar to that 
of Statistics New Zealand, but also 
different in significant and important 
ways (Cameron & Poot 2010, 2011, 2014a, 
2016). The model uses the same sub-
national fertility and mortality 
assumptions as Statistics New Zealand, 
with a distribution around the median 
assumption based on past observations of 
fertility and mortality. The methods used 
to derive projections of fertility and 
mortality are fairly similar in most 
applications, and the degree of uncertainty 
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is relatively low, so there is little added 
value in using our own projections.
In contrast, the projection of 
parameters that capture migration is not 
only the least certain, but also involves the 
greatest variation in methods. Statistics 
New Zealand’s subnational population 
projections incorporate a projection of 
net migration as a single absolute number 
for each TA (which sum to net migration 
for New Zealand as a whole), which is 
then disaggregated by age and sex. In 
contrast, the model employed in this 
article improves on that method in two 
ways (the methods will be explained in 
greater detail in a forthcoming working 
paper). First, migration is disaggregated 
into international migration (emigration 
and immigration) and internal migration, 
which are each modelled separately. 
Emigration and immigration are each 
modelled as a single absolute number, 
similar to Statistics New Zealand (but for 
international migration in each direction 
separately, rather than net migration), 
and then allocated to TAs using a simple 
model based on population shares, which 
are then disaggregated by age-sex-specific 
migration profiles.
Second, internal migration is 
modelled using a gravity model. Gravity 
models are excellent tools for modelling 
directional migration flows and are 
widely used in trade as well as migration 
(Poot et al., 2016). The model explicitly 
recognises that the migration flow 
between two areas will depend on the 
population size of the two areas (larger 
populations in the origin or destination 
will lead to larger migration flows) and 
the distance between them (greater 
distances will lead to smaller migration 
flows). Gravity models of internal 
migration flows in New Zealand have 
recently been developed (Cameron & 
Poot 2014b; Poot et al., 2016).
The advantages of the model used 
here is that it allows us to derive 
population projections based on a full 
range of directional migration flows (to 
and from a given area, both 
internationally and internally within 
New Zealand). While this makes the 
model more complex, it also makes the 
model more believable for end-users 
since questions of where migrants are 
coming from (or going to) can be readily 
answered (Poot et al., 2016).
The subnational stochastic population 
projections model was run 1000 times, 
each time drawing new fertility, mortality, 
and migration parameters from their 
distributions. This number of projection 
runs is sufficient to establish the 
distribution of projected populations. 
The results presented below are based on 
these model runs, and are expressed 
probabilistically (i.e. as a probability that 
a given area will experience population 
decline over a given decade). These results 
can be evaluated in a vast number of ways. 
For simplicity, I look only at two 10-year 
periods: (1) 2023-2033; and (2) 2043-
2053. I ignore the first decade of 
projections for two reasons. First, the 
degree of uncertainty is fairly low in the 
initial period, relative to later periods. 
Second, the initial period includes the 
current and historically high net migration 
that New Zealand is experiencing (and 
which has been included in the modelling 
assumptions), meaning that few areas are 
projected to experience population 
decline in the 2013–2023 decade. However, 
the current high net international 
migration is unlikely to continue 
indefinitely, so after 2023 the projected 
net international migration is assumed to 
fall back to levels seen historically. For 
each of the two decades, I compute the 
proportion of scenarios for each TA where 
population declines over the ten-year 
period.
Results
Figure 1 provides an illustration of a 
stochastic (probabilistic) population 
projection, for New Zealand as a whole. 
This projection was constructed bottom-
up by summing the individual TA-level 
projections. The solid black line at the 
centre represents the median projection 
– this is the point where fifty percent of 
observed projections are above, and fifty 
percent of observed projection are below, 
for each point in time. It is important to 
note that the median projection does not 
represent a single projection scenario – it 
is constructed from all 1000 scenarios. 
The narrow dark grey band around the 
median projection is the 50 percent 
projection interval – 50 percent of the 
observations in each period fall within 
this band (and 50 percent outside of that 
band). The wider (and lighter-coloured) 
band around the 50 percent projection 
interval is the 90 percent projection 
interval – 90 percent of the observations 
in each period fall within this band, with 
5 percent of observations above the top of 
this band, and 5 percent of observations 
below the bottom of this band.
Several points should be noted about 
the national projection in Figure 1. First, 
the historic period of high international 
immigration that New Zealand is 
experiencing is reflected in the high initial 
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increase in population before flattening 
out. This is based on the international 
migration assumptions within the model, 
which are similar to those of Statistics 
New Zealand in terms of net international 
migration – approximately 50,000 per 
year for the first five years, decreasing to 
about 15,000 per year from 2023 onwards. 
Second, the degree of uncertainty in the 
projections increases over time, as 
represented by the widening of the 
50-percent and 90-percent projection 
intervals. Third, as a whole, New Zealand 
is not projected to experience population 
decline before 2063 under the assumptions 
in this model. However, a focus on the 
projected population for New Zealand as 
a whole would mask substantial 
differences in the projected populations 
of different subnational areas, to which I 
now turn.
Table 1 lists the TAs that are projected 
to experience population decline in at 
least five percent of scenarios for each 
period (2023–2033; and 2043–2053). The 
TAs are categorised by the relative 
certainty/uncertainty of population 
decline into three categories: (1) those 
with between five and 50 percent 
probability of population decline; (2) 
those with between 50 percent and 90 
percent probability of population decline; 
and (3) those with a greater than 90 
percent probability of population decline. 
TAs that are not listed in each period have 
less than a five percent probability of 
population decline. These TAs are not 
listed to single out particular areas are 
facing problems, but to note the 
distribution and the change in numbers 
over time. 
Several things should be noted about 
these lists. First, the number of TAs 
appearing in each category increases 
between the two periods. More TAs are 
facing population decline in the 2043–
2053 decade than in the 2023–2033 
decade. This corroborates recent work 
that has shown similar results (Jackson & 
Cameron 2017; Jackson 2016). In the 
2023–2033 decade 20 TAs face a 90 percent 
or greater probability of population 
decline, compared with 26 TAs in the 
2043–2053 decade. Granted, these TAs 
have relatively small populations, 
representing 12.2 percent of the national 
population in 2023 (for the 2023–2033 
group based on median population size) 
and 17.2 percent of the national 
population in 2043 (for the 2043–2053 
group).
Second, many TAs increase in the 
likelihood of population decline over 
time, shifting from a lower probability 
group (or unlisted) to a higher probability 
group. Two TAs in this group (Buller 
District and Upper Hutt City) are 
particularly notable in that they switch 
from a very low probability of population 
decline in the 2023–2033 decade (less 
than five percent) to a very high 
probability of decline in the 2043–2053 
decade (greater than 90 percent).
Third, three TAs (Rotorua District, 
Opotiki District, and South Waikato 
District) move in the opposite direction, 
reducing in the probability of population 
decline between the two decades. These 
TAs have both relatively young 
populations and relatively high fertility 
rates, which may explain this unexpected 
result.
Table 1: TAs facing probable population decline, 2023-2033 and 2043-2053
Probability of 
population decline
Year
2023–2033 2043–2053
5-50%
Central Otago
Mackenzie
South Wairarapa
Southland
Thames-Coromandel
Hastings (+)
Marlborough (+)
Opotiki (-)
Rotorua (--)
Waimate (+)
Waitaki (+)
50-90%
Clutha
Gisborne
Masterton
Opotiki
South Taranaki
Stratford
Central Otago (+)
Hurunui (++)
Mackenzie (+)
South Waikato (-)
South Wairarapa (+)
Tasman (++)
Wellington (++)
90+%
Central Hawke’s Bay
Gore
Grey
Horowhenua
Invercargill
Kaikoura
Kawerau
Lower Hutt
Otorohanga
Porirua
Rangitikei
Rotorua
Ruapehu
South Waikato
Tararua
Wairoa
Waitomo
Wanganui
Westland
Whakatane
Buller (+++)
Central Hawke’s Bay
Clutha (+)
Gisborne (+)
Gore
Grey
Horowhenua
Invercargill
Kaikoura
Kawerau
Lower Hutt
Masterton (+)
Otorohanga
Porirua
Rangitikei
Ruapehu
South Taranaki (+)
Southland (++)
Stratford (+)
Tararua
Upper Hutt (+++)
Wairoa
Waitomo
Wanganui
Westland
Whakatane
N.B. (+) indicates a one-category increase in the probability of population decline; (++) indicates a two-category increase; (+++) 
indicates a three-category increase; (-) indicates a one-category decrease; and (--) indicates a two-category decrease.
Source: Author’s projections
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Finally, the TAs on the list are mostly 
(but not exclusively) rural and peripheral 
areas. With the exception of Wellington, 
the main centres do not make an 
appearance anywhere on the list. As 
population decline is projected to be an 
increasing, and increasingly likely, feature 
of rural and peripheral New Zealand, 
population will concentrate further in the 
main urban centres. For instance, based 
on median projections Auckland city is 
projected to grow from 33.6 percent of the 
total population in 2013 to 40.2 percent in 
2053.
Conclusion
This article posed the question: “Is 
population decline inevitable for 
New Zealand’s rural and peripheral 
areas?” The answer is clearly ‘no’. I have 
demonstrated that fewer than one-third 
of TAs are projected to experience near-
certain decline, which may be a high or 
a low proportion, depending on one’s 
perspective. However, demography 
is clearly not destiny. In a few TAs, 
the probability of population decline 
reduces over time. Those TAs tend to 
have relatively youthful populations and 
relatively high fertility rates, neither of 
which are necessarily replicable for policy-
makers in other areas.
This presents a clear challenge for 
policy-makers in rural and peripheral 
areas that are facing near-certain decline. 
As explained by Jackson and Cameron 
(2017), migration is no panacea for these 
areas – the number of migrants required 
to reverse population decline that is 
driven in large part by ageing rural 
populations is simply too great. Moreover, 
as Jackson and Cameron (2017) note, 
migrants eventually add to the problem of 
an ageing population in declining areas. A 
recent Maxim Institute report outlines the 
case for ‘accepting and adapting’ to 
depopulation (Wood 2017), and this 
approach would seem to be most suitable 
in a lot of rural and peripheral areas (see 
also McMillan 2016). Creative ways will 
need to be found to adapt to a declining 
rating base, to ensure that a minimum 
level of services is available to remaining 
residents. 
The analysis presented here has several 
limitations. The model is still under 
further development, particularly in 
terms of the projection of international 
migration (Cameron & Poot 2016). 
Future developments and improvements 
are likely to change the projections 
presented here. The model can capture 
parameter uncertainty and parametric 
variability, but cannot adequately deal 
with model uncertainty. Uncertainty 
about the optimal model to use for 
population projections will persist, and 
provides good reason for Statistics New 
Zealand to not be the sole provider of 
subnational population projections in 
New Zealand. Where the Statistics New 
Zealand and other projections provide 
similar results, this should provide 
additional confidence in their validity, 
and where they diverge, we should 
consider the projections to be somewhat 
more uncertain.
In future research, my collaborators 
and I will look at the factors associated 
with a high (or low) probability of 
population decline, to attempt to identify 
the lead indicators of the decline. This will 
build on work based on Statistics New 
Zealand projections by Jackson (2016). 
Developing a better understanding of the 
lead indicators of population decline will 
enable decision-makers to better 
anticipate the resulting changes in the 
population.
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